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ABSTRACT Those who care about and engage in politics frequently fall victim to cognitive
bias. Concerns that such bias impacts scholarship recently have prompted debates – notably,
in philosophy and psychology – on the proper relationship between research and politics. One
proposal emerging from these debates is that researchers studying politics have a professional
duty to avoid political activism because it risks biasing their work. While sympathetic to the
motivations behind this proposal, I suggest several reasons to reject a blanket duty to avoid
activism: (1) even if it reduced bias, this duty would make unreasonable demands on
researchers; (2) this duty could hinder research by limiting viewpoint diversity; (3) this duty
wrongly implies that academia offers a relative haven from bias compared to politics; and (4)
not all forms of political activism pose an equal risk of bias. None of these points suggest that
researchers should ignore the risk of bias. Rather, researchers should focus on stronger evi-
dence-based strategies for reducing bias than a blanket recommendation to avoid politics.
A hazard of dedicating one’s life to the study of politics – whether in philosophy, polit-
ical science, psychology, or some other field – is developing passionate views on the
subject. Beyond just studying politics at arm’s length, some researchers look to use
their expertise to effect political change. They champion policies, work on campaigns,
and even run for office.1 But such activism raises concerns, since the desire to advance
political ends can consciously and unconsciously influence research in ways that
undermine its validity.2 Though appealing to some researchers, political activism also
can pose risks to their work.
What are the ethical obligations of researchers facing this dilemma? Among pro-
fessional organisations, the American Political Science Association addresses this
question perhaps most directly. Its guide to professional ethics recognises that pro-
fessors often feel pulled to politics and rejects an outright ban on activism,3 a posi-
tion dating back to the 1960s.4 Research on cognitive bias, however, recently has
prompted other disciplines to reevaluate their relationship to politics. In psychology,
Jonathan Haidt and others raise concerns that the dominance of certain partisan
views in the field undermines research by biasing methodological approaches and
the interpretation of evidence.5 In philosophy, Bas van der Vossen argues that, since
political activism risks biasing research, scholars studying politics have a duty to
avoid activism.6
Such debates bring needed attention to the dangers that cognitive bias poses to
research. This article examines researchers’ ethical responsibilities to minimise bias,
and specifically the argument that they have a duty to avoid political activism. While
sympathetic to the motivations behind this argument, I offer several reasons to reject
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a blanket duty to avoid activism: (1) even if it reduced bias, this duty would make
unreasonable demands on researchers; (2) this duty could hinder research by limit-
ing viewpoint diversity; (3) this duty wrongly implies that academia offers a relative
haven from bias compared to politics; and (4) not all forms of political activism pose
an equal risk of bias. None of these objections suggest that researchers should ignore
concerns about bias. But a more promising approach lies in pursuing stronger
evidence-based strategies to reduce bias in research, which the end of the article
discusses.
The Case for Avoiding Political Activism
To start, it is important to specify what is meant by political activism. Here it refers to
actions intended to advance political goals, which include contacting public officials
and asking them to support a policy; mobilising others to contact public officials; run-
ning for public office; championing policies, candidates, and political parties in the
public sphere; and volunteering for and donating to political campaigns and organisa-
tions. If one takes an especially expansive view of the political sphere, where virtually
all action (or inaction) has political consequences and is thus political, a much broader
range of activities could count as political activism. But here, political activism is
understood more narrowly and involves those actions typically associated with it, like
donating to a campaign or participating in a protest. For our purposes, political
activism remains a category of action that individuals potentially could avoid.
One activity difficult to categorise is voting. Since voting advances political goals, it
seems to qualify as political activism. Notably, some journalists and military officers
choose not to vote, worried it would compromise the objectivity demanded by their
job.7 Here, though, I assume political activism does not include voting. That approach
avoids saddling the argument for avoiding political activism with the controversial
claim that certain professionals should not vote, which many see as a civic duty. To
address the argument in its strongest form, I focus on more involved types of activism,
which play a more salient role in people’s lives and thus are likely to influence other
activities (like research).
A recent argument for scholars to avoid activism comes from the aptly titled article
‘In Defense of the Ivory Tower’ by Bas van der Vossen. Though focused on political
philosophers, his argument applies broadly to those researching politics – scholars in
‘sociology, political science, economics, gender studies, psychology, and so on’.8 In
his proposal, scholars focus on seeking truth and producing accurate research, while
leaving politics to others.
It is worth sketching this argument to show what makes it compelling. Van der Vos-
sen first introduces what he calls the Principle of Responsible Professionalism (RP)
and applies it to political philosophers:
(1) Principle of responsible professionalism (RP). People who take up a certain role or
profession thereby acquire a prima facie moral duty to make a reasonable effort to
avoid those things that predictably make them worse at their tasks.
(2) The task of political philosophers is to seek the truth about political issues.
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(3) Therefore, political philosophers have a prima facie moral duty to make a reason-
able effort to avoid those things that predictably make them worse at seeking the
truth about political issues.9
This first part of the argument is valid – (3) follows from (1) and (2) – but some ques-
tion premises (1) and (2), which require explanation and defence.
RP captures the idea that professions come with certain responsibilities. For
instance, surgeons should take reasonable steps to avoid activities likely to make them
worse at their job, like drinking alcohol before surgery. If RP required professionals to
give up their hobbies, never see their families, and spend all their time practicing their
craft, it would ask too much. But RP only demands reasonable precautions, not perfec-
tion.10
Other qualifications guard against further objections. Most obviously, RP does not
apply to morally bankrupt professions.11 If a government asks soldiers to carry out
genocide, it is absurd to claim RP applies. Also, RP involves a prima facie rather than a
categorical duty, which means other moral duties sometimes override it. Normally, it
would violate RP if a professional runner took a month off during their most critical
training period, but not if they did so to care for a dying parent, since another obligation
overrides RP.12
These qualifications help clarify RP, but ambiguity remains. In particular, the term
‘reasonable’ does a lot of work in its definition. It is unclear where to draw the line
between a reasonable and unreasonable amount of effort in avoiding things that
undermine job performance. For instance, professional athletes have demanding prac-
tice schedules. Sometimes they want a break. Would skipping an hour of practice a
week violate RP? How about five hours? No clear guidelines come with RP for making
those determinations.
Despite this ambiguity, it makes sense to accept RP based on a charitable reading of
it. Though RP cannot always distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable effort,
there are some clear cases where avoiding an activity harmful to one’s job only requires
reasonable effort (e.g. not drinking before surgery). In other words, we can accept RP
and apply it in certain cases, even if we do not know how to apply it in all cases. That
concession is what van der Vossen needs for his argument. His goal is not to deter-
mine the ethical status of all action but a specific category of action – political activism
by scholars.
Perhaps more controversial than RP, premise (2) claims that political philosophers’
task is to seek the truth about politics. Some understandably balk at this claim. In pol-
itics, experts disagree about a host of normative and factual matters – the nature of
justice, the causes of war, money’s influence in elections, and the list goes on. Some
question whether there is any truth at all, given the many perspectives from which to
view any issue and the fact that even widely accepted scientific theories usually end up
being falsified (e.g. Newtonian physics). Anyone claiming to have discovered the truth
about politics faces an army of sceptics.
Despite these concerns, premise (2) need not imply that scholars will fully grasp the
truth anytime soon. Researchers can recognise their incomplete understanding of the
world and still work to advance it. It is this commitment to truth that van der Vossen
has in mind.13 Scholars advance human knowledge, even if the complete truth eludes
them.
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Understood in this way, premise (2) no longer appears as controversial as it first
seems. Still, it faces other objections. Some say the real task of political philosophers is
to figure out what justice is and advance it.14 But even for those who take this view, it
is a mistake to completely dismiss premise (2). As van der Vossen points out, making
the world more just requires understanding how it works and causal relations within
it.15 Without such knowledge, proposals to advance justice can backfire and exacerbate
the very oppression they seek to end.16 Given that risk, academics committed to
advancing justice also should value seeking the truth.
Others may accept that the overall goal of research is to seek the truth, but reject it
for individual researchers. On this view, researchers tenaciously defend their claims so
that they gain wide acceptance, not to seek the truth. The strongest argument ulti-
mately rises to the top as each side defends their position as vigorously as possible.
That view may seem compelling to those sympathetic to Hugo Mercier and Dan Sper-
ber’s argumentative theory of reason, which says reason’s primary function is rhetori-
cal – that is, developing arguments to persuade others.17
Even if one accepts that theory, it does not follow that the overall research process
advances toward truth when individual researchers abandon this goal. In fact, Mercier
and Sperber suggest the opposite. They attribute science’s tremendous advances to
the demanding standards of the scientific community. If one researcher puts forward
biased and mistaken claims, other researchers likely will criticise them. To succeed,
researchers must exercise pre-emptive self-criticism by anticipating critiques before
they are raised. Their peers’ demanding standards thus foster a commitment to seek-
ing truth.18 If researchers abandon this commitment in favour of rhetorically com-
pelling but faulty claims, there is no guarantee their work will track toward the truth,
especially when we consider other contexts with few incentives against introducing
faulty claims (e.g. social media).
So there are good reasons to accept the first half of van der Vossen’s argument.
Scholars’ commitment to seek truth and produce accurate work is key to advancing
research as well as justice. As part of this commitment, scholars should take reason-
able steps to avoid activities that predictably would hinder the accuracy of their
research. Van der Vossen concludes his argument by identifying political activism as
one such threat:
(4) Being politically active predictably makes us worse at seeking the truth about
political issues.
(5) Therefore, political philosophers have a prima facie moral duty to avoid being
politically active.19
Premise (4) is plausible on its face, but evaluating it and the conclusion requires a clo-
ser look at the empirical evidence on the link between politics and cognitive bias,
which we turn to next.
Politics and Cognitive Bias
Decades of research make clear the pervasive role of cognitive bias: people regularly
violate basic principles of logic and probability in their judgments, fail to update
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beliefs in response to new facts, and are influenced in their evaluations by factors
they believe should be irrelevant.20
Many such errors result from motivated reasoning. When reasoning, individuals
have accuracy goals (arriving at the most accurate conclusion) but also directional
goals (arriving at the conclusion matching their beliefs, attitudes, and desires).21 Moti-
vated by the latter, people fall victim to confirmation bias, which protects and bolsters
their existing views.22
Such bias often affects political judgments. When encountering studies on the death
penalty’s deterrent effect or polls on an upcoming election, people find information
affirming their views more credible.23 What they believe or want to believe biases how
they process political information.
Partisan identities exacerbate this problem. When people identify with a political
party, they often develop an enduring emotional attachment to it.24 This identity leads
to favourable views of one’s party and intergroup bias,25 a finding in line with research
on group identities.26 Party attachment makes individuals vulnerable to motivated rea-
soning. If they encounter information challenging a policy championed by their party,
such information can threaten their identity. In fact, brain imaging shows that parti-
sans have positive emotional reactions to information affirming their identity and nega-
tive reactions to information threatening it.27 To protect their identity, partisans often
will look for reasons to reject threatening information.28
There is abundant empirical evidence for motivated reasoning by political partisans.
When asked factual questions – like if inflation or unemployment went up or down
during a president’s term – opposing partisans give different responses. For Republi-
can presidencies, Republicans give responses reflecting a more positive assessment of
the economy than do Democrats, and the opposite is true for Democratic presiden-
cies.29 Similarly, partisans better remember political facts favourable to their party than
facts unfavourable to it.30 Opposing partisans seem to occupy different worlds, as their
party identities bias their perceptions of politics.
Unsurprisingly, partisan identities influence more subjective judgments. In experi-
ments where partisans evaluate college applicants, they prefer fellow partisans, even
when an applicant of another party has stronger qualifications (e.g. higher grades).31 Par-
tisans also judge hypocrisy by opposing party politicians more harshly.32 Party attach-
ments even lead partisans to support policies they normally would reject, as evident from
experiments manipulating party endorsement of welfare policies. Party endorsement pre-
dicts partisans’ preferences better than policy content. If their party endorses it, Demo-
crats favour stringent welfare policies and Republicans favour generous ones – contrary
to their ideological views.33
Some like van der Vossen see such studies as evidence that political activism raises the
risk of biased research. Undoubtedly, partisan identity often biases political judgment.
Studies regularly find that strong partisans exhibit higher levels of biased and motivated
political reasoning than ambivalent partisans or independents.34 That finding, though,
fails to count as direct evidence that political activism – which is related to but distinct
from partisanship – leads to bias. Most experiments on political reasoning and bias do
not assign participants to different levels of activism, and therefore do not directly mea-
sure activism’s effects on bias. This lack of direct evidence certainly leaves open the pos-
sibility that activism causes bias. But it is important to also consider other explanations
consistent with the available evidence.
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One relevant finding is that strong partisans, in addition to often exhibiting greater
bias in political judgments, engage the most in activism.35 Different explanations could
account for this link between activism, bias, and partisanship:
(a) Politics corrupts: political activism strengthens individuals’ partisanship and makes
them more susceptible to bias;
(b) Politics attracts biased people: strong partisans are drawn to political activism, but
come to it already more susceptible to bias; or
(c) Bias is everywhere: those with strong group identities exhibit bias in many con-
texts, and political activism does not pose a unique risk of bias compared to other
activities.
These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, each has some
truth to it.
First, political activism likely corrupts and exacerbates bias in many instances. Acti-
vism often (though not always) occurs in ideological silos, where individuals primarily
interact with fellow partisans in ways that make their partisan identity more salient.
When surrounded by like-minded others, people tend to perceive their beliefs as more
credible and to dismiss outgroup views, making it difficult to recognise their own blind
spots and biases.36 Similarly, experimental evidence suggests that making group iden-
tity salient increases intergroup bias, and leads people to find outgroup messages and
policies less persuasive.37 By making individuals’ party identity salient and surrounding
them with others who bolster this identity, political activism can strengthen partisan-
ship and associated biases.
Second, those less influenced by partisan biases appear to participate less in politics.
Diana Mutz finds that those in ideologically diverse social networks exhibit greater
political tolerance and awareness of the rationales for different political views. These
individuals seem less susceptible to forms of intergroup bias associated with strong
partisanship, as they are more willing to see merit in and not dismiss different political
views. Interestingly, these individuals engage less in politics, suggesting that politics
instead attracts people more susceptible to bias.38
Third, cognitive bias’s pervasive influence recommends caution in singling out polit-
ical activism as a unique threat. Cognitive bias is associated with a wide range of activ-
ities. Confirmation bias always looms as a risk when defending political positions,
whether in activism, conversations with friends, or academic writing. Moreover, activi-
ties outside politics – such as religious devotion or even research – can bolster identi-
ties and beliefs in ways that bias political judgments.39 Political activism thus loses its
distinctiveness and represents part of a larger minefield threatening judgment. Some
may conclude from this fact that the duty to avoid political activism also implies giving
up many other activities. Yet by implicating so many activities, the argument for this
duty runs the risk of proving too much.
To summarise, those more susceptible to bias participate more in politics, this par-
ticipation often exacerbates bias, and so too do activities in many other contexts. Bias
ultimately operates in ways more complex than the argument to avoid activism
implies, which makes it difficult to defend this duty in blanket form, as the following
sections explain.
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What Makes a Duty to Avoid Activism Unreasonable
A close look at van der Vossen’s argument reveals that its conclusion does not strictly
follow from its premises. According to the argument, political philosophers have a
moral duty to make a reasonable effort to avoid things that predictably make them
worse at seeking the truth about politics. But does avoiding political activism only
require reasonable effort? A suppressed premise answering yes is necessary to reach
van der Vossen’s conclusion:
(3) Political philosophers have a prima facie moral duty to make a reasonable effort
to avoid those things that predictably make them worse at seeking the truth about
political issues.
(4) Being politically active predictably makes us worse at seeking the truth about
political issues.
Suppressed premise: With reasonable effort, political philosophers can avoid being
politically active.
(5) Therefore, political philosophers have a prima facie moral duty to avoid being
politically active.
From one perspective, this suppressed premise seems obvious and its omission
insignificant. Rather than make excessive demands, the duty to avoid activism only
requires researchers to stay away from a nonessential activity. Van der Vossen makes
this point: ‘Many people stay out of political activism and do just fine. Activism is not
a necessary ingredient of a good life’.40
This explanation proves unsatisfactory, however. To understand why, it is helpful to
consider the implications of a duty to avoid activities that raise the risk of biased
research. Evidence suggests that religious activity can have biasing effects similar to
political activism. Religious identities are associated with intergroup bias, as activities
that make these identities salient often strengthen bias.41 Such bias risks undermining
research, since it can lead scholars to portray their religious ingroup as having a more
positive impact on politics than religious outgroups. So a duty to avoid political acti-
vism seems to also imply a duty to avoid religious activity. In fact, van der Vossen’s
explanation for why a duty to avoid activism is not too demanding also applies to reli-
gion: just as many people avoid politics and do just fine, the same is true for many
who are not religious.
Most, though, would be uncomfortable with a duty to avoid religious activity. Reli-
gion is a core part of some people’s identity. Asking researchers to forsake it would be
an onerous requirement, out of line with what professions typically demand. There
thus is good reason to reject the demand as unreasonable, even if it minimised bias.
Disciplines could offer strategies for minimising bias related to religious identity, but
that is different from asking researchers to abandon it altogether.
If a duty to avoid religious activity is unreasonable, it becomes difficult to defend a
duty to avoid activism. Political identities, after all, can be just as important to individ-
uals as religious identities. Consider a researcher whose child has a disability and who
is active in the disability rights movement. Through this activism, their identity as a
disability rights advocate becomes a core part of them. Though many have meaningful
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lives without engaging in activism, that’s beside the point. For this individual, giving
up their commitment to a cause they care about would deprive them of a deep source
of meaning. In some cases, a duty to avoid political activism makes demands just as
onerous and unreasonable as a duty to avoid religious activities.
One could respond that, in cases where researchers have strong political identities,
other commitments override their prima facie duty to avoid activism, but this duty still
applies to others. That defence, though, deprives the duty of all its bite. A duty to
avoid political activism that only applies to researchers without strong political identi-
ties fails to discourage those most tempted by activism, thus undermining the rationale
behind it. The duty becomes largely superfluous, only applicable to those least likely
to engage in activism.
There is another reason why the duty to avoid political activism proves unreason-
able: it threatens researchers’ integrity. Sometimes research leads an investigator to
change their mind. When that happens, research can – and arguably should – prompt
changes in behaviour. Consider a philosopher who, after researching effective altruism,
concludes that those well off have an obligation to give much of their salary to effective
charities aiding the poor. This conclusion prompts the philosopher not just to publish
on the subject, but also to donate more to effective charities. Such action rarely sets
off alarm bells. After all, the ideal of integrity carries the expectation that someone
championing an ethical principle should also uphold it in their own life.42
If it is permissible to act on research in this instance, it seems that those studying
politics should have the same permission. Donating to effective altruism could cause
someone to identify more strongly with the cause and raise the risk of biasing their
research on it. Consider a similar case where a political scientist donates to effective
drug reform efforts after researching the topic. Despite the risk of bias, it is generally
recognised in the first case that a scholar should be allowed to incorporate insights
from their research into their own life. That approach gives scholars an opportunity to
correct gaps between their research findings and personal habits. A blanket duty to
avoid activism mistakenly denies that opportunity to those researching politics.43
Activism and Viewpoint Diversity
Another problem with a duty to avoid political activism is that, if universally adopted
by scholars, it risks hindering the overall research process. An academy without schol-
ars engaged in politics is one that loses diverse perspectives, which could help advance
research. Because activism increases viewpoint diversity, it has the potential to benefit
research.
The classic statement on the value of viewpoint diversity comes from On Liberty by
John Stuart Mill, which argues for freedom of expression because it exposes people to
different views – either truths they had not considered or errors that push them to
sharpen their arguments.44 Scott Page presents an updated version of this idea by
explaining how diversity improves problem solving in various contexts, including
research. Page notes that, when engaged in problem-solving tasks, people draw on
tools provided by their backgrounds, perspectives, and knowledge. Bringing diverse
problem-solvers together creates opportunities for those with different insights and
perspectives to build on the discoveries of others, who could not see their full
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implications. Diversity thus can propel problem solving forward in ways that a single
individual or those with similar perspectives cannot.45
Lu Hong and Page develop a formal proof to show that diversity improves problem
solving.46 Though this evidence is valuable, there are concerns about whether the
assumptions of such models hold in the real world.47 So in evaluating diversity’s
impact on problem solving, it is important to examine the empirical evidence. A
review of this research does find that diverse groups outperform homogenous groups
under certain conditions. Diversity in the areas of skills, expertise, and information
proves most effective in improving group performance.48
These findings suggest that political activism has the potential to benefit research.
Engaging in politics – managing a campaign, lobbying, serving in elected office – often
provides individuals with skills, expertise, and information they otherwise would lack.
They learn the intricate workings of a campaign, see political challenges overlooked by
the media, and develop expertise in how political coalitions function. Activists also
face different incentives than academics – like incentives to pass legislation rather than
publish peer-reviewed research – which impact what political challenges and issues
occupy their attention. Because of their experiences, activists may see aspects of poli-
tics differently than how the academic literature portrays them. The point here is not
to suggest that the perspectives conferred by activism are superior to those conferred by
academic work. It is rather to suggest that political activism provides different perspec-
tives from those gained in academic work. When those perspectives participate in the
research process, they add diversity and have the potential to improve it.
Such diverse perspectives would be lost in a hypothetical academy where the duty
to avoid political activism kept out all activists. This state of affairs likely would reduce
some of the bias that now affects research, but at a cost. Without contributions from
activists, research likely would suffer from certain blind spots and overlook aspects of
politics that those directly involved in such work would be more likely to notice.49
One response to this criticism is that scholars should gain insights from activists by
interviewing them, while upholding a duty to avoid politics.50 But this approach proves
unsatisfactory given how research works in practice. When scholars embark on
research, they often do so with a hypothesis in mind that influences the questions they
ask and information they seek. Political experiences can push individuals to ask ques-
tions and formulate theories others do not – that is, produce scholarship that would
never materialise if they remained outside the research process. A duty for scholars to
avoid political activism thus eliminates diverse and potentially valuable perspectives
from the research process, which counts as a reason against it.
Illusory Benefits of Retreating to the Academy
A duty to avoid political activism implies that academia offers a relative haven from
bias compared to politics. In reality, academia poses risks of bias similar to those
found in politics, which undermines the claim that scholars must avoid political
engagement because it constitutes a unique threat to research.
Several experiments examine bias in the peer-review process and find scholars often
exhibit confirmation bias. Reviewers are more likely to recommend journal submis-
sions that align with their theoretical and ideological views, while seeking reasons to
© 2019 The Author. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.
Political Activism and Research Ethics 9
reject submissions that conflict with them.51 As one study finds, a paper with the same
methodology elicits significantly different reviewer reactions based on whether its
results match their views.52 In other contexts, such as debates over curriculum
content, scholars give biased accounts of their opponents’ positions similar to how
political opponents mischaracterise each other.53
Such research suggests that scholars regularly fall victim to bias, but leaves unre-
solved how bias in academia compares with bias in politics. Findings relevant to this
question come from forecasting studies, which measure how well individuals predict
future political and economic events. When making predictions, forecasters encounter
ambiguous information and often exhibit bias when interpreting it. Identifying the
most accurate forecasters sheds light on what traits help people avoid bias when gath-
ering and interpreting information. Notably, these studies find little evidence that
occupational background or academic credentials impact prediction accuracy. Explain-
ing the results of a large forecasting study of experts in various fields, Philip Tetlock
writes: ‘It made virtually no difference [in terms of their accuracy] whether partici-
pants had doctorates, whether they were economists, political scientists, journalists, or
historians, whether they had policy experience or access to classified information, or
whether they had logged many or few years of experience in their chosen line of
work’.54 What matters instead is how individuals think. The most accurate forecasters
exhibit actively open-minded thinking: they seek out more information before making
decisions, consider rather than dismiss evidence contrary to their beliefs, and revise
predictions in light of new information.55
Though not conclusive evidence, forecasting studies cast doubt on the idea that aca-
demia helps insulate individuals from bias compared to other contexts. That should
not come as a surprise given the nature of academic work. Similar to politicians,
researchers stake out public positions and vigorously defend them, making them vul-
nerable to confirmation bias. Scholars cannot fully escape this risk. Instead, their best
option is cultivating strategies to navigate this risk effectively, such as actively open-
minded thinking.
Academia’s lack of political diversity also increases the risk of bias. As discussed
above, being surrounded by like-minded others often strengthens partisanship, inter-
group bias, and motivated reasoning. One valid concern about political activism is that
it exacerbates bias by surrounding individuals with fellow partisans and limiting expo-
sure to opposing views. Similar concerns apply to academia, where scholars tend to be
concentrated on the political left.56
That finding raises concerns, since political conversations with those of different
views happen most often at work. Mutz’s research on social networks finds that the
workplace facilitates such conversations by bringing politically diverse people together,
whereas many other contexts – like places of worship – do not because their member-
ship tends to be politically homogenous.57 Due to academia’s political makeup, schol-
ars encounter less political diversity in the workplace than many others do. By
isolating scholars from certain political perspectives, academia creates an environment
suited for strengthening partisan commitments, as well as biases associated with them.
Some might say this concern counts for rather than against a duty to avoid politics.
If scholars heeded this duty, certain political identities would not dominate academia
and it would be freer from bias. This defence, though, runs into a problem: the case
to avoid political activism conveys an individual duty that applies now. Van der Vossen
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does not argue for a duty that would only apply in a hypothetical future when acade-
mia is depoliticised. Regardless of what others do, individual scholars today have an
obligation to avoid politics. Yet running to the ivory tower offers little in terms of min-
imising bias. In fact, it suffers from a problem also associated with political activism –
a lack of political diversity, which can exacerbate bias.
It is important to be frank about these shortcomings in academia. If we only focus
on bias in politics, the many examples of biased reasoning there make it easy to jump
to the conclusion that politics poses a unique threat to research and scholars should
avoid it. But when we take a fuller view of how bias operates in both politics and aca-
demia, it becomes less clear that scholars who retreat to the latter minimise the risk of
bias. As a result, a duty for scholars to avoid politics rests on shaky ground. Rather
than avoiding entire spheres of action – with risks similar to spheres that researchers
cannot avoid – it seems more prudent to cultivate tools and manners of thinking that
help minimise bias across contexts.
Not All Forms of Activism Pose an Equal Risk of Bias
Finally, a blanket duty to avoid political activism fails to distinguish between different
types of activism, which can imply that they pose similar risks of bias. That position is
implausible, given the many forms activism takes.
Partisan forms of activism often surround individuals with like-minded others,
heightening their party identity and exacerbating bias when they interpret political
information related to their identity. Given the many positions parties take, partisan
activism can impact judgments on a wide range of issues, and thus raises legitimate
concerns. But not all activism takes partisan form. Sometimes individuals advocate for
a single issue without identifying strongly with a party. Issue advocacy can, of course,
increase confirmation bias in the evaluation of information related to the cause cham-
pioned. But such bias may prove harmless to the research process if what a scholar
advocates for (e.g. disability rights) has little relation to what they study (e.g. environ-
mental policy).
Moreover, activism sometimes involves individuals across the political spectrum
working together for a common goal, thus exposing them to people of different politi-
cal persuasions. Examples include conservative and progressive activists partnering to
change environmental and criminal justice policy.58 Given academia’s lack of political
diversity, such cross-partisan activism could benefit researchers by helping them
escape their ideological silos and come in contact with different political perspectives.
Any suggestions about the comparative effects of different types of activism are nec-
essarily speculative because there is little experimental work directly measuring acti-
vism’s impact on bias, let alone experimental work comparing various forms of
activism. Still, given activism’s diverse forms, there is good reason to believe that dif-
ferent political activities impact bias in different ways. When a proposed duty to avoid
activism ignores that point, it lacks nuance and is likely too expansive in what it
prohibits.
For this reason, those hoping to salvage a duty to avoid activism would be better off
adopting a more modest approach – identifying specific forms of activism that pose high
risks of bias. (In light of concerns raised above, ideally this more limited duty would
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not require researchers to abandon core political identities). Right now, it is difficult
to formulate such a duty given the lack of empirical studies comparing different forms
of activism and their effects on bias. But the critique outlined here leaves open the
possibility that future research could identify specific forms of activism that pose par-
ticularly serious threats of bias, which scholars reasonably could be asked to avoid.
The Difficult Task of Reducing Bias
The claim that researchers studying politics have a blanket duty to avoid political acti-
vism runs into several problems. This duty makes unreasonable demands on research-
ers, hinders viewpoint diversity, offers illusory benefits for minimising bias, and fails to
distinguish between different forms of activism and hazards associated with them. So
there is good reason to reject this duty. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the
underlying worry motivating the case for avoiding activism – namely, that bias poses
real dangers to research. Cognitive bias can undermine the validity of research, which
not only puts scholars’ credibility in jeopardy, but also hampers their ability to use
research to solve real-world problems and improve welfare. Reducing bias’s influence
on research clearly represents a worthy goal.
Daunting challenges stand in the way of this goal due to the pervasive and deep-
rooted nature of cognitive biases. Psychologists have had far more success identifying
cognitive biases than in developing strategies to eliminate or reduce them.59
But despite such challenges, there has been some progress. Forecasting studies find
that probability training and actively open-minded thinking improve prediction accu-
racy.60 Other experiments show that trainings on common types of cognitive bias have
debiasing effects that persist months later.61
Drawing on this research, disciplines could provide researchers with training focused
on recognising bias and encouraging actively open-minded thinking. Such training
could occur in graduate programs and as continuing education opportunities at aca-
demic conferences. There would need to be experimentation and adaptation over
time, as we gain a better understanding of which debiasing interventions work best.
Effective interventions should be incorporated into the structures that train researchers
– graduate programs, professional conferences, and the like.
Experimental research also shows that accountability helps reduce bias by prompting
individuals to be more self-critical and consider potential criticisms before presenting
their work.62 Structures of accountability already exist in academia in the form of peer
review and the public dissemination of research. Academia’s lack of political diversity,
however, can weaken these mechanisms of accountability. Because of confirmation
bias, findings congenial to the dominant political views can receive less scrutiny. Such
bias in peer review has the effect of exaggerating evidence for the dominant political
views while underestimating contrary evidence.
One way to address this problem is fostering political diversity in academia. Some
balk at this idea because it brings to mind preferential treatment in hiring for certain
political groups. But that proposal proves controversial even among those whom it
would benefit,63 and other ideas have a better chance of gaining acceptance. An obvi-
ous step is including political affiliation in non-discrimination policies. Though evi-
dence does not suggest that discrimination is the primary reason for the
© 2019 The Author. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.
12 Ben Jones
underrepresentation of certain political groups in academia,64 it may have an effect in
fields where a number of scholars condone such discrimination.65 Beyond non-
discrimination policies, other proposals worth consideration include programs to
recruit graduate students from underrepresented political groups and increasing the
political diversity of editorial boards and reviewer databases.66
So there are potential strategies for reducing bias in research. These strategies focus
on helping researchers recognise their biases, become more skilled at actively open-
minded thinking, and engage diverse points of view. As our understanding of cognitive
bias advances, scholars studying politics will need to continually revisit their ethical
responsibilities regarding activism and minimising bias. Given the current evidence, a
blanket duty on researchers to avoid political activism proves less compelling than
some have suggested. Researchers would be better served focusing on stronger
evidence-based approaches for reducing bias.
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University Park, PA 16802, USA. btj7@psu.edu
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